Category: Public Discourse

  • The rise of Edutainment, and its implications.

    The rise of Edutainment, and its implications.

    I came across this little article recently from the NY Times, on the prevalence of the broader general public turning to education based entertainment for their downtime. Rather than merely switching off and not engaging their faculties. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/education/turning-to-education-for-fun.html

    Let me quote from the article:

    What does it mean when people who can afford to spend their time however they please hunker down in front of their flat screens to watch theoretical physicists or experts on other subjects lecture for hours?

    Entertainment values have come to dominate many aspects of life, but another trend has been playing out, too. Call it the academization of leisure. It can be found in the live-streaming TED Talks lectures, the Great Courses, learning vacations, podcasts, science centers, brain-training games and retirement communities like Lasell Village in Newton, Mass., whose residents must complete “a minimum of 450 hours of learning and fitness activity each calendar year,”…

    I find this really fascinating, certainly the increase in ‘edutainment’ or more positively framed, the rise of a broadly educated populace, is appealing. In many ways having a broader education and knowledge base helps people think from their own frameworks, and analyse perspectives better. It should also help the general public engage in better and justifiable public discourse, rather than unsubstantiated positions.

    However, on the flip-side it also leads to a rise in the outward exemplification of the Dunning-Kruger effect, where a little knowledge actually hinders engagement with longer term learning and education at a broader level.

    Nevertheless, I am still optimistic about this trend, and will be interested to see how it plays out. Thoughts? How do you see it working in your context?

  • Why is everyone else so incompetent? Attribution Errors – Bias Wednesday

    Why is everyone else so incompetent? Attribution Errors – Bias Wednesday

    ‘Why did that person just run that red light? They obviously don’t know how to drive.’

    We hear it all the time, the tendency to attribute malice or incompetence to another individual or group, when if it was us doing the action it would be merely an accident: ‘I just didn’t see it.’ Welcome to the second edition of Cognitive Bias Wednesday. While there are many reasons for this tendency, a lot of them stem from a suite of cognitive bias known as Attribution Errors, with the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) at their root. Simply put it is the tendency for people to emphasise internal decisions and characteristics for other’s negative actions, while emphasising external factors for their own negative actions. FAE pops its head up in a wide variety of situations, and we probably unconsciously express it every day, it is one of the most powerful decision rationalisation biases.

    peanuts

    One classic study of the FAE looked at drinking rates amongst adolescent males, and took two observations: firstly, how much an individual drank, and secondly whether they thought that their peers drank more, the same, or less than them.[ref]Segrist, Dan J., Kevin J. Corcoran, Mary Kay Jordan-Fleming, and Paul Rose. “Yeah, I Drink … but Not as Much as Other Guys: The Majority Fallacy among Male Adolescents.” North American Journal of Psychology 9, no. 2 (June 1, 2007): 307.[/ref] While actual drinking rates across the group averaged similarly, the attribution of drinking rates amongst the peers was strongly externally inflated. As seen in the title of the study ‘I drink … but not as much as other guys.’ While not attributing incompetence or malice, the negative perception of drinking rates is externally magnified and internally denied. This is despite the drinking rates remaining relatively steady across the cohort. We have the tendency to attribute our own negative characteristics externally, and attribute other’s negative characteristics to their internal space.

    1325563668658_882818Furthermore this is only exacerbated when it is brought into a social setting. While the nature of the FAE is powerful on an individual level it is stronger again amongst groups. The expanded bias, creatively named Group Attribution Error, sees the attributes of the out-group as being defined by individual members of that group. We met this bias briefly in the post a couple of weeks ago on Cyclists vs Motorists and Intergroup biases. This is further expanded again with Pettigrew’s, again creatively named, Ultimate Attribution Error (one must wonder where to go after this). While FAE and GAE look at the ascription to external and out-groups primarily and discard most internal and in-group data, Ultimate Attribution Error seeks to not only explain the demonisation of out-group negative actions, but explain the dismissal of out-group positive behaviours. Interestingly many of the studies that support Pettigrew’s Ultimate Attribution Error look at religio-cultural groups as their case studies, such as the study by Taylor and Jaggi (1974), or later studies on FAE/UAE and suicide bombing (Altran, 2003).

    Excursus: One brief and curious aside is that according to one study Protestants appear to be more internally focused, lower rates of FAE/GAE, in comparison with Catholics who are generally externally focused, with higher rates of FAE/GAE.[ref]Li, Yexin Jessica, Kathryn A. Johnson, Adam B. Cohen, Melissa J. Williams, Eric D. Knowles, and Zhansheng Chen. “Fundamental(ist) Attribution Error: Protestants Are Dispositionally Focused.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 102, no. 2 (February 2012): 281–90. doi:10.1037/a0026294.[/ref] The authors theorise that this is due to an innate greater emphasis on the soul within Protestantism. I will have to look more into their article, and perhaps post on it later.

    Excursuses aside, how do these attribution errors affect day to day research and study? One of the ways I think they powerfully affect good academic research and debating is when it comes to the assignment of scholarly labels within academia. I sometimes have students come to me asking if I can point them towards material that is ‘more liberal’ (in the theological sense). Now while I applaud students for wanting to seek alternative views to their own, the level of out-group attribution of ‘liberalism’ commonly leads to a flimsy disagreement with the argument at hand. Commonly it goes like ‘I disagree with this argument because its a liberal argument, and therefore…’ Conversely it works in the opposite fashion ‘I agree with this [flimsy] argument, because we are part of the same group.’ A similar bias is found in several recent articles on the religion and science interface. The argument there commonly goes ‘Religion introduces bias, therefore no confessionally religious people can debate this topic.’ The attribution of innate bias to an out-group, in the same fashion that incompetence is attributed to an observed poor driver, is at play here.

    Being aware of our tendency to attribute negative internal characteristics to an out-group participant should help us assess things better in two ways. Firstly it should help us to assess arguments and evidence on the grounds that they are presented, not on the group that they are presented from. In short play the game not the person or group. Stick to the argument and evidence that is set forth and assess it on those grounds, whether you agree or disagree with the person or group who is promulgating it. Secondly, it should help us see blind spots within our own research and work. If we are constantly assessing others based on the same qualities, then we are more likely to be critical with our own research based on the arguments and evidence, rather than letting it float on in-group support.

    Attribution errors can be extremely hard to overcome, but knowing about them certainly helps. Hope you have enjoyed this Cognitive Bias Wednesday, as usual weigh in below on the comments!

  • ‘Get the F*** off OUR roads’ – Motorists, Cyclists and Intergroup Bias

    ‘Get the F*** off OUR roads’ – Motorists, Cyclists and Intergroup Bias

    In Australia it is that time of year again… summer. Where the weather gets nicer, and in Adelaide the Tour Down Under arrives in town. Now unsurprisingly this annual event sees the  seasonal rise of visible cyclists, and of course accompanying it the usual diatribes and vitriol flashing about in all directions over the topic. There are many directions that these ‘conversations’ inevitably go in, be it down the path of licensing, or psychopathic motorists, or apparent flagrant disregard for the law… from both sides. However, none of these are what I want to address in this post. Rather, I think it is helpful to look at some of the underlying factors within the cyclist/motorist interaction, specifically that of group biases and Social Identity Theory (SIT). It is especially helpful in this case because the interaction is relatively arbitrary and crosses many other more complex social bounds in a relatively equal fashion. This helps as it acts as a type of microcosm or case study that can inform much more complex interactions.

    ingroup-outgroupFirstly, an exceedingly brief overview of SIT and some of the biases at play. SIT was formulated by Henri Tajfel and John Turner in the late 70s and early 80s as a means of exploring intergroup relations. [Ref]Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour.” In Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel. Chicago, Ill: Nelson-Hall, 1986.[ref] Primarily SIT seeks to define groups and their relations such that there is a form of predictive capability of the interactions between the groups. At a secondary level it allows for a structured methodology for analysis of intergroup relations and conflict, the primary use for it in this situation. Since SIT’s proposal has been augmented by a series of papers that have investigated how SIT may be used to elucidate further aspects of intergroup interaction. Of particular relevance here is the work by Struch and Schwartz. [ref]Struch, N., and S. H. Schwartz. “Intergroup Aggression: Its Predictors and Distinctness from in-Group Bias.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56, no. 3 (March 1989): 364–73.[/ref] There they note some of the factors that impact upon intergroup aggression; quoting from their abstract:

    Perceived intergroup conflict of interests, the postulated motivator of aggression, predicted it strongly. The effects of conflict on aggression were partially mediated by 2 indexes of dehumanizing the out-group (perceived value dissimilarity and trait inhumanity) and by 1 index of probable empathy with it (perceived in-group–out-group boundary permeability).

    In effect they name ‘intergroup conflict of interest’ as the primary motivator, and impacted by the dehumanisation of the out-group and the permeability of the boundaries. Finally in another study by Mackie et. al. they found significant application of the fundamental attribution error within groups, novelly naming this ‘group attribution error.’ [ref]Mackie, Diane M., Scott T. Allison, and David M. Messick. “Outcome Biases in Social Perception: Implications for Dispositional Inference, Attitude Change, Stereotyping, and Social Behavior.” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology – ADVAN EXP SOC PSYCHOL 28 (1996): 53–93. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60236-1.[/ref] In lieu of the longer post on FAE to come the simplified understanding is such that in-group members characterise out-group members by individual actions (and usually those that serve the in-group confirmation bias).

    Aggressive Motorist CartoonSo how does this impact upon our little case study? Well if the motorist/cyclist dynamic is dichotomised between cyclists and motorists, as the debates ensue, then SIT can be utilised in looking at the intergroup interactions. Addressing the first of the sub factors from Struch and Schwartz, even though the permeability between groups is incredibly high, with many bicycle riders owning cars, and obviously vice-versa, the perceived permeability is exceedingly low. I would suggest that this is due to the mutual exclusivity of the means of transport, its impossible to operate both at the same time, and only a marginal percentage of cars are seen with bike racks. Furthermore the proliferation of the ‘ownership’ of the roads, as highlighted by the large number of aggressive claims to ‘our’ roads from both sides serves to further delineate the groups.

    The second of the Struch and Schwartz characteristics is that of dehumanisation of the out-group, and this is extremely easy to see in the language used in the debates. Via that erudite medium of Facebook I have seen a plethora of invectives such as ‘death cage operators’, ‘lycra scum’, etc with many more that aren’t worth repeating. All of these serve to remove the person from the out-group, and replace them with a dehumanised label. For an even more prevalent example of this, see the American propaganda during the Vietnam war dehumanising the Vietnamese as monkeys (c.f. the work of Albert Bandura on the same). The last of Struch and Schwartz’ characteristics is that of conflict of interests, which in this case is the usual and predictable conflict over space on the roads.

    Mackie’s applications of group attribution error can be relatively easily seen as well with the anecdotal evidence base significantly outweighing any statistical or Bayesian measures. The usual argument appears: ‘I saw a cyclist breaking the law, therefore all cyclists break the law’ or ‘I was harassed by a road Cyclist Denigrated Cartoonraging driver once, therefore all motorists are out to kill me.’ As with most, if not all, attribution biases there is an element of truth there, but little to no statistical significance or repeatability. So these anecdotal ‘evidences’ serve only to strengthen the out-group discrimination bias, and reinforce the in-group bias. Furthermore the inverse is true, motorists don’t self-characterise by those ‘hoons’ or criminals who kill people in accidents, and neither do cyclists self characterise by those who run red lights and knock down pedestrians. The confirmation and attribution bias flows in both directions.

    Finally it is worth acknowledging that there are a plethora of other factors at work, from confirmation biases to clustering illusions, empathy gaps and many more. However, the majority of these serve to reinforce existing group boundaries, rather than dissolve them, so while they contribute to the bigger picture it is in terms of detail rather than applicability.

    So what can be done with this situation? It is all well and good to use SIT to describe an intergroup interaction, but as with many aspects of academia it is hollow if left there. One of the advantages of describing the interaction in this way is that participants in the groups get to see how their biases shape the interaction as a whole. This is where education comes into play. While educating cyclists that not all motorists are homicidal psychopaths, and educating motorists that not all cyclists are flagrantly law-flaunting dilettantes will not remove those who are genuinely homicidal psychopaths and flagrant law-flaunters, it does break down the boundaries somewhat.

    This breaking down of the boundaries is important on two levels, firstly as it dismantles some of the conflict, and secondly as it removes places for those who genuinely are psychopathic or law flaunters to hide within their respective in-groups. I note that the Motorcycling Victoria is doing significantly more on the education front than I have seen the cycling and motoring groups do in recent times. See this video here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u3mWQJ9UOm8 There are many more applications of SIT in identifying biases and breaking down the stereotypes, such as serving to re-humanise the participants in each in-group and many more that I don’t have the time to explore here now. Suffice to say that proper analysis of the intergroup bias and interactions helps to inform efforts to resolve issues. But I would also suggest that without a good understanding of the group dynamics at hand there will be little traction in the plethora of discussions to be had.

    Lastly, its worth noting that while the cyclist/motorist example is a salient one for many, myself included as I span both groups (disclaimer: motoring AND cycling enthusiast), it can readily be extrapolated to other intergroup conflict. The other swirling debates over ‘Islam vs the West’, various racial disputes, Republican v Democrat, Liberal vs Labor, liberal vs conservative, religious vs atheist, and many more all find application within the realm of SIT. Furthermore they all can be assisted in better conversation and possible resolutions [ref]Many resolutions are likely impossible, but at least not debating over useless topics[/ref] to various degrees by identifying the intergroup conflicts and seeing the origins and reinforcement of the biases present.

    What do you think? Weigh in on the comments below.

  • Larry Hurtado on Labels in Scholarship

    Larry Hurtado on Labels in Scholarship

    This morning I noticed that Larry Hurtado has blogged on the prevalence of reductionistic and entrenched camp labels and their usage in scholarship. I must say I couldn’t agree more with the sentiment and how poisonous reductionistic and pejorative labels can be. Both when they are used to shore up weak and insufficient argument, and when they are used to compromise and tear down the arguments of others.

    I especially liked his take on scholarly works:

    But to my mind, for scholarship to mean anything, the only thing that counts is what a given scholar says/writes, and how well based it is:  How well it takes account of all relevant evidence, how soundly it is reasoned, how well it engages the positions of others, etc.

    As scholars and students, and even more as Christians, we should strive after excellence in our scholarly works, rather than bandying around labels to support or tear down.

    I do encourage you to read it on his blog over here: http://larryhurtado.wordpress.com/2014/10/20/more-on-labels-and-scholarship/

  • Justification of beliefs – a philosophical perspective.

    Justification of beliefs – a philosophical perspective.

    three_legged

    Further to the last few posts here is the publication announcement of an article that a friend at church has just had accepted for publication:

    http://philpapers.org/rec/SILODJ

    No, justified belief isn’t simply clicking the “Justify Text” button in Word, but rather how we support and rationalise our beliefs. Interestingly Paul argues that even false beliefs can be validly justified. I’ll let his own words do the talking:

    More to the point, I argue that so long as one actually has good reasons for belief, it is possible to have a justified belief that is based on the worst possible reasons. For example, basing a belief on tarot card readings, irrational bias, coin flips, etc. is no barrier to doxastic justification

    He continues to expand on his argument in the brief on his own website here: http://paulsilvajr.com/2014/08/18/is-basing-really-necessary-for-doxastic-justification/

    I’m looking forward to hearing more from Paul on it, and perhaps even making it along to his presentation on the 21st of August at Melbourne Uni.

  • Opinions… like bums, everyone has one?

    Opinions… like bums, everyone has one?

    important-opinions-stamp

    Perhaps opinions are like bums, and everyone has one. But perhaps they shouldn’t be paraded around in public all that often. Patrick Stokes has written an article over on The Conversation to this effect, arguing that internal and external evidences for opinions should not be weighed equally. I think this backs up some of what i wrote on the last blog post, regarding how to do public discourse well. Check out the article on The Conversation here: http://theconversation.com/no-youre-not-entitled-to-your-opinion-9978 Also, this is what i posted on John’s wall on the same:

    It is simply putting forward that unsubstantiated opinions should be treated as subjective opinions, not objectively argued positions. 

    Upon reflection this is at the core of the issue that came out from last Monday’s Q and A, and the subsequent discussion on this wall! The elevation of subjective opinion as equal to or trumping objectively argued positions is actually the real detriment to free speech. 

    Lets take a hyperbolic example: Person A argues that because sucrose is harmful for teeth, then eating apples should be banned (fallacious argument, but supported by evidence). Person B argues that ‘I like apples’. In the current climate A and B arguments are viewed as equivalently supported, with external and internal ‘evidence’ being quantified equally.
    Or perhaps at the risk of a re-hash of last week: Prof Stackhouse makes well supported statement regarding the writings in the Quran. Sussan Ley stated “I don’t think that the Quran teaches that.” Ensuing discussion revolved around whether Stackhouse was being judgemental: again internally and externally provided ‘evidence’ quantified equally.

    Also of interest to this conversation is this   Tell me if you agree, or disagree? Or simply that my bum shouldn’t be exposed here…